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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a self-contained overview of the present problems of state finances in 
India. It begins with an overview of historical evolution and current institutional 
structures, including economic, political, administrative and fiscal aspects of India’s 
federal system. The paper then reviews the current situation of India’s state government 
finances, going on to consider various developments that have shaped the states’ current 
fiscal situation, including the roles of national economic reform, the intergovernmental 
transfer system, tax reform, and local government reform. Policy options for reforming 
institutions of fiscal federalism system, borrowing mechanisms for the states, and 
governance are then discussed, with an emphasis on the principle that states should have 
appropriate incentives for fiscal discipline at the margins of revenue and expenditure. 
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1. Introduction 
India is a large and heterogeneous nation, with ancient traditions coexisting with 
modernity. It has successfully created and preserved the world’s largest democracy, with 
over a billion people. It has held fourteen national elections, and only once, briefly, has 
the supremacy of democratic institutions in the country been threatened. One secret of 
India’s success has been its balance of national unity with diversity at the subnational 
level. Within the framework of the Constitution, a variety of political approaches and 
ideologies have flourished. This variety has increased in the past two decades, with 
regional identities playing a greater role in state and national politics. At the same time, 
there has been a gradual movement towards at least a weak consensus with regard to 
economic policy, with the market being given a greater role than in the past. Arguably, 
economic policy changes have spurred more rapid growth. 
At the same time, the political system has faced new challenges as a result of 
economic liberalization. Regional inequality has increased, and there is a growing threat 
of private affluence thriving as islands in the midst of public squalor, as governance has 
sometimes been reduced to handouts and retreat from responsibility. On the other hand, 
some states or regions have been able to become homes for world-class enterprises. More 
and more, attention has shifted from national policy to state government functioning. The 
Indian states provide stark contrasts in terms of their economic and political performance. 
However, one common development they have all shared is deterioration in their fiscal 
situations over the last decade. Understanding state finances in India, and how to repair 
them in the context of overall economic reform in India, will be a crucial task over the 
next few years, if India is to maintain a high growth trajectory. The past problems of 
countries like Argentina and Brazil are a stark reminder of the high social and economic 
costs of things going wrong at the level of subnational national finances. 
This paper provides a broad, relatively self-contained overview of state finances 
in India. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of historical 
evolution and current institutional structures, including economic, political and 
administrative aspects of India’s federal system. Details of India’s fiscal federal 
arrangements are provided. Section 3 reviews the current situation of India’s state 
government finances, going on to consider various aspects in detail, including the roles of 
national economic reform, the intergovernmental transfer system, tax reform, and local 
government reform. Policy options for redesign of the intergovernmental transfer system, 
borrowing mechanisms for the states, and reform of governance are then discussed in 
Section 4, with an emphasis on the principle that states should have appropriate 
incentives for fiscal discipline at the margins of revenue and expenditure. We argue that 
substantial reform is required in all of these dimensions. Section 5 offers a summary 
conclusion regarding systemic reforms and their impacts. 
 
2. Context and Background 
The origin of many of India’s federal institutions can be found in its history as a 
British colony. At the same time, the circumstances of independence, with its traumatic 
partition of the country, also played a major role in shaping the structure and working of 
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the country’s intergovernmental relations. Different ideological positions and economic 
circumstances have affected overall federal institutions, which are briefly reviewed in this 
section.1 
 
Historical Development 
 In the nineteenth century, the British gradually took over a subcontinent that was 
politically fragmented and strife ridden.  The Government of India Act of 1858 imposed 
direct sovereignty under the British Crown, with an ad hoc mixture of centralized (the 
Viceroy, an Executive Council, and a small number of district level British 
administrators) and decentralized (the Indian princely states) administrative structures. As 
Crown rule was consolidated, the British attempted administrative decentralization: 
municipal governments were introduced, and large sub-national units were split.  As a 
nationalist political movement grew, financial decentralization was begun as a prelude to 
meeting the perceived need for local self-government. Initially, some expenditure 
categories (e.g., police, health, education) were assigned to the provincial governments, 
which received annual lump-sum grants, and now had separate budgets.  Subsequently, 
further devolution of expenditure assignments and revenue authority, took place, along 
with arrangements for revenue sharing.  
 After World War I, the British responded further to competing interests in India. 
A 1918 report on constitutional reforms articulated a vision of India as a decentralized 
federation, and led to further authority being devolved to the provinces.  The Indian 
government remained essentially unitary, but the subjects of administration and sources 
of revenue were divided into central and provincial jurisdictions.  An initial proposal for 
assignment of tax authority would have required provincial contributions to fund the 
central government, but this was changed to ensure greater central fiscal autonomy, and 
the sharing of central income taxes with the provinces.  The 1935 Government of India 
Act proposed relatively loose federal structures, and provided for the distribution of 
legislative jurisdictions with a three-fold division of powers into Federal, Provincial and 
Concurrent Lists. On the fiscal front, the Act provided a detailed assignment of tax 
authorities and revenue sharing scheme.   
 Indian independence overtook the implementation of the federal provisions of the 
1935 Act, but the framers of the Indian Constitution relied heavily on this Act for the new 
constitutional framework.  However, the effects of the partition of the country 
strengthened the desire for a strong center.  The conception of federalism was shaped 
accordingly: a division of powers between center and states, but with residuary powers 
explicitly at the center, and central ability to impinge severely on the states in special 
circumstances. Thus, the Constitution incorporated centralizing features that were not in 
earlier British legislation, though closer to their practice in India. While the political 
structures envisaged in the 1935 Act were largely abandoned in the Constitution, the 
details of assignments of expenditure and revenue authorities, as well as of revenue 
sharing and grants were preserved.   
 
                                                 
1 Further background may be found in Singh and Srinivasan (2005a) and Rao and Singh (2005). 
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Political and Administrative Structures 
India has been a constitutional democracy since 1950, now comprised of 28 
states, six “Union Territories” (UTs) and a National Capital Territory (NCT), Delhi. The 
states, plus the NCT and the UT of Pondicherry, have elected legislatures, with Chief 
Ministers in the executive role. The other UTs are governed directly by appointees of the 
center. Each state also has a Governor, nominally appointed by the President, but 
effectively an agent of the Prime Minister. The primary expression of statutory 
constitutional authority in India comes through the directly elected parliamentary-style 
governments at the national and state level, as well as nascent directly elected 
government bodies at various local levels. Overlapping political authorities at the central 
and state levels have been dealt with through intra-party bargaining, and, more recently, 
through explicit bargaining and discussion. The Inter-State Council (ISC) was created in 
1990, and has become a forum where some political and economic issues of joint concern 
can be collectively discussed and possibly resolved. The ISC includes the Prime Minister, 
state Chief Ministers, and several central cabinet ministers as members. While the ISC is 
merely advisory, it has formalized collective discussion and approval of several important 
matters impinging on India’s federal arrangements, including tax sharing and inter-state 
water disputes.  
Political and economic centralization have been reflected in bureaucratic and 
judicial institutions. The Indian bureaucracy is provided constitutional recognition, 
through the provisions of Part XIV of the Constitution. Since each political layer of 
government requires its own administrative apparatus, any bureaucracy in a federation 
will have a federal character: state governments must be able to appoint and dismiss 
bureaucrats to implement state-level policies. This is true for India, with a central 
bureaucracy as well as an independent bureaucracy in each state. However, the key 
component of the bureaucracy is the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), whose 
members are chosen by a centralized process and trained together, though then assigned 
to particular states. At the national and state levels, the judiciary constitutes a distinct 
branch of government, though the legislative/executive branch influences appointments.  
At the local level, IAS members are vested with some judicial authority. The Supreme 
Court, at the top of the judicial hierarchy, has powers that include broad original and 
appellate jurisdiction and the right to rule on the constitutionality of laws passed by 
Parliament. There has been conflict between the Supreme Court and the 
legislature/executive over the scope of these powers, but in specific issues of center-state 
relations concerning taxation and property rights, the basic centralizing bias of the 
Constitution tilted the Court’s interpretation towards the center. At the state level, below 
the Supreme Court, the High Courts superintend the work of all courts within the state, 
including district and other subordinate courts. 
    
Fiscal Federal Institutions 
Tax and expenditure assignments 
The Indian Constitution, in its Seventh Schedule, assigns the powers and 
functions of the center and the states. The schedule specifies the exclusive powers of the 
center (the Union list) and the states (the State list), and those under joint jurisdiction (the 
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Concurrent list).  All residuary powers are assigned to the center.  The nature of the 
assignment of expenditure functions is fairly typical of federal nations, and broadly fits 
with economists’ theoretical rationale.2  The functions of the central government are 
those required to maintain macroeconomic stability, international trade and relations, and 
those having implications for more than one state.  The major subjects assigned to the 
states comprise public order, public health, agriculture, irrigation, land rights, fisheries 
and industries and minor minerals. The states also assume a significant role for subjects 
in the Concurrent list, such as education and transportation, social security and social 
insurance.  
The assignment of tax powers in India was based on a principle of separation, 
with tax categories being exclusively assigned either to the center or to the states.  Most 
broad-based taxes have been assigned to the center, including taxes on income and wealth 
from non-agricultural sources, corporation tax, taxes on production (excluding those on 
alcoholic liquors) and customs duty. A long list of taxes is assigned to the states, but only 
the tax on the sale of goods has been significant for state revenues.  This narrow effective 
tax base is largely a result of political economy factors that have eroded or precluded the 
use of taxes on agricultural land or incomes by state governments. The center has also 
been assigned all residual tax powers. The tax assignment system has some problematic 
features.  The separation of income tax powers between the center and states based on 
source (agriculture vs. non-agriculture) has created avenues for evasion.  Also, even 
though in a legal sense taxes on production (central manufacturing excises) and sale 
(state sales taxes) are separate, they tax the same base, causing overlapping and leaving 
less tax room to the states. Finally, the states were allowed to levy taxes on the sale and 
purchase of goods (entry 54 in the State list) but not services.  This provided avenues for 
tax evasion, and delayed the design and implementation of a comprehensive value added 
tax (VAT).  
The realized outcome of the Indian assignments of tax and expenditure authority, 
through their particular implementation, and the response of different levels of 
government and tax payers to the assignment, has been a substantial vertical fiscal 
imbalance. In 2002-2003, the states on average raised about 38 percent of government 
revenues, but incurred about 58 percent of expenditures.  Transfers from the center made 
up the difference – though perverse fiscal incentives for the states in this system have, 
arguably, increased the imbalance. In fact, the ability of the states to finance their current 
expenditures from their own sources of revenue saw a long-run decline, from 69 percent 
in 1955-1956 to 52 percent in 2002-2003. In terms of total expenditure (including capital 
spending), the states were even more dependent on the center, with only 42 percent of 
their overall spending being covered by their own revenue receipts in 2000-01 (RBI 
Annual Reports). There are four main transfer channels to cover vertical imbalances, 
described next, in turn. 
                                                 
2 Economic theories of government are based on the idea that public (non-rival and non-exclusive) goods 
are not well provided by the market mechanism.  In addition, if governments are not perfectly informed and 
intrinsically benevolent, subnational governments may be better able to judge the desired levels of local 
public goods, and, potentially, can be given more specific electoral incentives to do so than national 
governments.   
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Finance Commission Transfers 
It was recognized in the Constitution that its assignment of tax powers and 
expenditure functions would create imbalances between expenditure and revenue, both 
vertical (between center and states) and horizontal (among different states).  Therefore, it 
provided for the sharing of the proceeds of certain centrally levied taxes (e.g., non-
corporate income tax, Article 270; and Union excise duty, Article 272) with the states, as 
well as grants to the states from the Consolidated Fund of India (under Article 275).  
Recent constitutional changes in this scheme have simplified this sharing arrangement, 
replacing it with an overall share of the consolidated fund.  The shares of the center and 
the states, and their allocation among different states are determined by the Finance 
Commission, which is also a constitutional creation, and is appointed by the President of 
India every five years (or earlier if needed). Finance Commission transfers are mostly 
unconditional in nature. The Finance Commissions’ approach to federal transfers has 
consisted of (i) assessing overall budgetary requirements of the center and states to 
determine the resources available for transfer from the center during the period of 
recommendation, (ii) projecting states’ own revenues and non-plan current expenditures, 
(iii) determining the aggregate and individual states’ share of the consolidated fund of the 
center, and (iv) using grants to fill projected expenditure-revenue gaps remaining after 
tax devolution.   
Twelve Finance Commissions have made recommendations to the central 
government and, with a few exceptions, these have been accepted. The Commissions 
have developed an elaborate methodology for dealing with horizontal and vertical fiscal 
imbalances. In particular, the formula for tax devolution is quite complicated, as a result 
of attempts to capture simultaneously disparate (and even contradictory) factors such as 
poverty, ‘backwardness’, tax effort, fiscal discipline, and population control efforts. The 
result has been that the impact of Finance Commission transfers on horizontal equity 
(equalizing fiscal capacity across states) has been somewhat limited.3 Despite the ad hoc 
nature of the tax-sharing formula, its persistence reflects the nature of precedent that has 
grown around the Finance Commission, even though it is not a permanent body, and 
lacks continuity in its staffing and its analysis. Grants recommended by the Finance 
Commissions have typically been based on projected gaps between non-plan current 
expenditures and post-tax devolution revenues. As with tax sharing, these grants have 
generally been unconditional, although some commissions have attempted to enhance 
outlays on specified services in the states by making closed-ended specific purpose non-
matching grants.  In either case, the incentive problems with this “gap-filling” approach 
are obvious. Some commissions did try to incorporate normative growth rates of 
revenues and expenditures in their calculations, but these attempts were selective and 
relatively unimportant. Table 1 provides statistics on the relative magnitudes of tax 
sharing and grants in the Finance Commission’s transfers.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
3 See Rao and Singh (2005) and World Bank (2005). The exception is the so-called ‘special category’ 
states. These are hilly states on India’s borders, with strategic importance as well as cost disabilities in 
public good provision. 
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Planning Commission Transfers 
While the Finance Commission decides on tax shares and makes grants, a 
separate body, the Planning Commission, makes grants and loans (in the ratio 30:70 for 
the major states)4 for implementing development plans. As development planning gained 
emphasis, the Planning Commission became a major dispenser of such funds to the 
states.  As there is no specific provision in the Constitution for such plan transfers, the 
central government channeled them under the miscellaneous – and limited – provisions of 
Article 282.  Before 1969, plan transfers were project-based. Since then, the distribution 
has been done on the basis of a consensus formula (see Table 2) decided by the National 
Development Council (NDC).5 As with the Finance Commission formula, the Planning 
Commission tries to aggregate disparate objectives in its calculations, with the result that 
the overall impact is less than clear. One major contrast with the Finance Commission is 
the conditional nature of Planning Commission transfers. However, while the special 
category states receive plan transfers based on projects that they formulate and submit, 
the general category states’ plan transfers are not related to the required size or 
composition of plan investments. Hence there is not even implicit matching of states’ 
own resource commitments in this transfer channel, let alone an explicit matching 
formula. The process for determining plan transfers involves competing proposals from 
the Planning Commission and the states, with a certain amount of bargaining through the 
NDC, as well as in state-by-state discussions, to determine plan loans and grants. At the 
end of this process, the Planning Commission approves the state plans. At the margin, it 
is mainly the states’ own resource position that determines their plan expenditures.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Central Ministry Transfers 
Various ministries give grants to their counterparts in the states for specified 
projects, either wholly funded by the center (central sector projects) or requiring the 
states to share the cost (centrally sponsored schemes). Both these categories are reported 
together as central schemes in Table 1. The ostensible rationale for these programs is 
financing activities with a high degree of inter-state spillovers, or which are merit goods 
(e.g., poverty alleviation and family planning), but they are often driven by pork-barrel 
objectives. These projects are supposed to be monitored by the Planning Commission, 
and coordinated with the overall state plans – which is why they are typically listed under 
Plan transfers (e.g., Table 1) – but both monitoring and coordination are relatively 
ineffective. There are over 100 schemes, and attempts to consolidate them into broad 
sectoral programs have been unsuccessful. These programs have provided the central 
government with an instrument to actively influence states’ spending, replacing pre-1969 
plan transfers in this role. The proliferation of schemes may also have increased the size 
                                                 
4 The special category states (so called because they were placed in a special category for the purpose of 
planning – they are all hill states on the geographical periphery of India) receive a much higher proportion 
of Plan funds as grants. 
5 The NDC is chaired by the Prime Minister, and its members include all central cabinet ministers, Chief 
Ministers of the states, and members of the Planning Commission. Like the ISC, it serves as a bargaining 
and log-rolling body, though with a much narrower scope. 
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and control of the bureaucracy.  While the NDC recently appointed an investigative 
committee that recommended scaling down and consolidating centrally sponsored 
schemes, implementation of this proposal was weak. 
 
Loans and Guarantees 
In addition to explicit transfers, intergovernmental loans, to the extent that they 
are subsidized6 or completely written off, also constitute implicit transfers to subnational 
governments. Ideally, borrowing should be to finance investment, but state governments 
have increasingly used borrowing to meet current expenditure needs (now as much as 50 
percent). State governments need central government approval to borrow from the market 
if they are indebted to the center, and this constraint binds for all the states. Central loans 
(including Planning Commission and ministry-based project loans) now constitute about 
60 percent of the states’ indebtedness, with another 22 percent being market borrowing, 
and the remainder made up of pension funds, shares of rural small savings, and required 
holdings of state government bonds by commercial banks (Rao and Singh, 2002; 
Srinivasan, 2002). While these captive sources of finance are limited, the states have been 
able to soften their budget constraints further by off-budget borrowing or nonpayment by 
their public sector enterprises (PSEs). For example, the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) 
have been tardy in paying the National Thermal Power Corporation, a central PSE 
(Srinivasan, 2002). Other sources of softness in state government budget constraints 
include central government guarantees of loans made to state government PSEs by 
external agencies, and write-offs of past loans made to state governments. These write-
offs have regularly been a part of recent Finance Commissions’ recommendations, as 
debt relief for the states. 
 
3. Current Issues 
The current problems of state finances must be seen in the context of India’s 
history and institutions. Precedent, informal institutional norms and procedures, and 
formal legislative frameworks all play a role in determining fiscal behavior and outcomes 
at the state level.  In particular, the system of intergovernmental relations, as it developed, 
combined poor explicit incentives for subnational fiscal discipline with political and 
administrative controls to compensate. The current problems of state finances can be seen 
as the consequence of a relaxation of the latter controls, without complementary reforms 
in explicit incentives. 
 
Fiscal Situation of the States 
Aggregate state finances have deteriorated significantly since the late 1980s. 
Overall revenue deficits (i.e., differences between current revenues and expenditures) 
were nonexistent or negligible before that time. From 1987-88 onwards, the states taken 
                                                 
6 In some cases, central loans have been at higher than notional market rates, but it is not completely clear 
that those market rates would have been operative for subnational debt subject to risk without central 
guarantees. 
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as a whole have always been in revenue deficit, and the level increased from an average 
of 0.62% of GDP across the three years 1993-96 to 2.53% in 2000-03.7 This deterioration 
was greater than the worsening in overall fiscal deficits for the same period (2.55% to 
4.07%), reflecting the crowding out of capital expenditures by current expenditures such 
as subsides and salary payments. Perhaps the biggest single factor in explaining this trend 
was the Fifth Pay Commission’s award, which, spilling over to the states, led to a very 
large jump in the states’ wage bills. A third measure, the states’ total primary deficit (the 
fiscal deficit less interest payments) also worsened significantly from an average of 
0.69% of GDP over the 1993-96 period to 1.41% over 2000-03. A consequence of these 
continued and worsening deficits was a substantial increase in the debt-GDP ratio of the 
states, from 21 % in 1996-97 to 31% in 2002-03. The latest estimates for the revenue 
deficit (1.4% in 2004-05 and budgeted at 0.7% in 2005-06) reflect an improvement, but it 
is too early to confidently identify a trend.8 
Disaggregating the states’ deficits reveals that the source of deterioration has been 
increases in expenditures such as interest payments, rather than declines in own revenues 
or transfers from the central government (particularly tax sharing and grants determined 
by the Finance Commission). Of course, this view is predicated on the assumption that 
the “natural” income elasticity of tax revenues (sometimes called “buoyancy”) is equal to 
one. One could as well argue that the buoyancy of states’ tax revenues ought to be greater 
than one, which would imply that tax revenues have failed to grow at a pace consistent 
with that norm. The problem, though, is that no exact normative benchmark exists. We 
will return to the consideration of taxes in more detail later in the paper.9 For now, we 
present the aggregate data, which are summarized in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The first four data columns of Table 3 summarize trends in the four components 
of states’ revenues. Deterioration across the two three-year periods came in non-tax 
revenues and non-Finance Commission transfers, but even so, the total decrease 
amounted to only a little over half a percentage point of GDP. The increase in revenue 
expenditures in this same period amounted to 1.34% of GDP (Table 3, data column 5), 
and interest payments and pensions were major contributors to this jump. Further aspects 
of changes in expenditure (not shown in Table 3) have been increases in subsidies – with 
the power sector a major culprit – and a squeeze on Plan expenditure, which ought to be 
earmarked for capital projects. Note that some of the negative impact of the power sector 
also shows up in the decline in net non-tax revenues (Rao, 2003). 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
                                                 
7 These and other figures in this section are taken from the report of the Twelfth Finance Commission 
(Finance Commission, 2005). 
8 These figures are from the Economic Survey of India, 2005-06, available at 
http://indiabudget.nic.in/es2005-06/chapt2006/chap29.pdf. The improvement in the fiscal deficit, 4.0% in 
2004-05 and 3.4% in 2005-06 has been smaller, and the debt-GDP ratio has reached about 33%, though it 
may stabilize. 
9 See also Rao (2003) for a detailed discussion of tax revenues of the states. 
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Next, we turn to the performance of individual states. In many cases, the fiscal 
deterioration for the special category states was worse than that of the major states, but 
we focus on the latter here, as they contain the bulk of India’s population. Data for these 
15 states is shown in Table 4.10 Ranks are shown in parentheses, with a higher rank 
indicating a ‘worse’ number in terms of deficit, change in deficit, or debt stock. While 
there is considerable variation across the states, in terms of their fiscal positions and the 
level of deterioration, there is no clear pattern. High and low income states, reforming 
states as well as those that have moved slowly on reform, larger and smaller states, all 
have shown significant fiscal deterioration. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Some studies (e.g., Khemani, 2002; Purfield, 2003) have attempted to provide 
causal explanations of state deficits through cross-section or panel (pooled cross-section 
and time-series) regressions for the states. Explanatory variables include structural 
variables such as the share of agriculture in Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP), 
behavioral variables such as expenditure levels, and political variables such as affiliation 
between the ruling parties at the state and central levels. The results are suggestive, but 
not conclusive, with one unexplained issue being the variation in states’ fiscal 
performance from year to year. In other words, these regressions may not capture the 
essential mechanisms of state fiscal policy making, and hence do not uncover the 
underlying structural explanation of fiscal performance. However, Table 5 does indicate 
some of the underlying sources of states’ differing performance, without attempting a 
causal explanation through regression analysis. In Table 5, we again follow the 
convention of ranking from ‘worst’ to ‘best’, with ‘worst’ being low tax revenue or 
revenue increases, but high expenditure or expenditure increases. Of course, this 
characterization neglects the potential benefits of government expenditure,11 focusing 
only on the narrow fiscal consequences. Bearing out the earlier aggregate figures, we see 
from Table 5 that, while a couple of states have allowed own-tax revenues to slip 
substantially, the major source of fiscal deterioration has been increases in expenditures 
running well beyond tax revenues. Again, there is no obvious or simple link between the 
economic characteristics of the states and their relative revenue and expenditure 
performance. However, we proceed to consider various institutional contributors to the 
states’ current situation. 
 
Economic Reform 
The current fiscal challenges facing the states are closely tied to the process of 
economic reform that began (or accelerated, depending on the particular analysis) in 
1991, when India faced a severe balance of payments crisis, as well as a need for national 
                                                 
10 Following the analysis in the Twelfth Finance Commission Report, the new states of Chhatisgarh, 
Jharkand and Uttaranchal are combined with their respective ‘parents’ for the purposes of the comparison 
across the years.  
11 In fact, as pointed out in the Twelfth Finance Commission Report, revenue expenditure has tended to 
crowd out capital expenditure. 
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fiscal adjustment.12 Fiscal adjustment remains a major issue. However, reform has 
proceeded in fits and starts. Major steps have been taken in trade liberalization, removal 
of restrictions on domestic industrial investment, and in some aspects of financial sector 
regulation. To some extent, however, central government attempts at fiscal consolidation 
transferred some of the fiscal adjustment challenges to the state level. At the same time, 
the reforms gave state governments more freedom to make policies independently,13 and 
this has extended the impacts of openness to the subnational level. State governments 
now can affect the incentives of foreign capital to enter their jurisdictions. From the 
perspective of an Indian state, capital from another country or from another state can be 
treated equally in typical policy environments. The final impacts of the entry of capital on 
a subnational government will therefore depend also on the internal mobility of capital 
and labor. A further consideration is that the fiscal health of the states that results from 
their policies is likely to impinge on the entire nation’s credit rating in world capital 
markets.14 Reforms have also given the states the option of taking developmental and 
structural adjustment loans from multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank.  In principle, these are meant to improve the states’ short-run  
(through fiscal reforms) or long-run (through growth) fiscal positions, but in practice the 
systemic problem of soft budget constraints, operating through central government 
guarantees and bailout histories, makes these loans potential future contributors to the 
states’ fiscal stress (Rao, 2003). 
The central and state governments have also considered privatization as a tool for 
fiscal adjustment, in addition to any efficiency-enhancing role it may play. The large 
implicit subsidies for those employed in PSEs are an important aspect of resistance to 
privatization. The biggest problems have been in the power sector. In the case of state-
level PSEs such as the SEBs, there are additional twin problems of large deficits and the 
need for coordinated reform of the power sector. Electric power is a concurrent 
responsibility of the center and the states. Each state has had an SEB that is vertically 
integrated with respect to generation, transmission and distribution, and is part of the 
state government. Political compulsions and inefficiencies have led to large losses by the 
SEBs, and they have been a major contributor to the states’ fiscal deficits. The problem is 
even worse than budget figures indicate. For example, in 2000-01, the losses of the SEBs 
were over Rs. 260 billion of which only Rs. 60 billion were accounted for in the state 
budgets by way of explicit subsidies to the SEBs. While the power sector received early 
attention in the economic reform process, one of biggest hurdles to sectoral reform and 
new investment was the effective bankruptcy of the SEBs, leading foreign investors in 
generation to demand guarantees from the state governments for payments for electricity 
sales to the SEBs. Since the state governments themselves were in financial stress, they 
further asked for counter guarantees from the central government. Various attempts at 
                                                 
12 See Singh and Srinivasan (2005b) for a detailed discussion of the national fiscal situation. 
13 The responses of the states were varied, as were the results. Bajpai and Sachs (1999) provide a detailed 
survey and scorecard of the efforts and outcomes for 15 major states, arguing that the enthusiastic 
reformers have done better in terms of human development as well as narrower measures of economic well 
being.  
14 The mechanism by which this occurs can be direct, through larger combined deficits for the center and 
states, or indirect, through contingent liabilities arising from explicit central counter guarantees for state 
guarantees to foreign corporations. 
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reforming the power sector failed to make much headway, leaving this aspect of the 
states’ fiscal problem to fester, although reform finally seems to be coming through the 
latest Electricity Act. 
 
Intergovernmental Transfer System 
Despite the Finance Commissions’ success in establishing guidelines and stability 
for center-state tax sharing, their methodology and processes have been criticized.  The 
main earlier criticisms were (i) the scope of the Finance Commissions through the 
Presidential terms of reference was too restricted; and (ii) the design of their transfer 
schemes reduced state government incentives for fiscal discipline (through ‘gap-filling’ 
transfers), while doing relatively little to reduce inter-state inequities.15 The first of these 
criticisms has been partly met in the case of the last two Finance Commissions, which 
were given broad terms of reference with respect to assessing the overall fiscal position 
of the central and state governments. However, this has not translated into greater control 
over overall transfers: Planning Commission transfers and central ministry transfers are 
outside the Finance Commission’s control, though it can comment on their efficacy and 
associated decision processes.  
The fiscal discipline effects of Finance Commission transfers are particularly 
relevant to the states’ current fiscal stress, but there has been little effective change in 
recent years. The Eleventh Finance Commission added a weight for fiscal discipline, but 
this was not in itself a substantial enough incentive for the states, especially given the 
existence of alternative transfer channels, and off-budget operations. The Twelfth 
Finance Commission preserved this change, but reversed earlier declines in the relative 
weight given to population (Table 6), the latter change coming at the expense of the 
weights given to infrastructure, and to measures negatively related to income. The latter 
weights were meant to promote horizontal equity, and the Twelfth Finance Commission’s 
alternative to emphasizing this equalizing channel was to increase various kinds of 
grants, which were also sometimes made categorical (such as for health and education). 
Unfortunately, this approach increases the ad hoc nature of transfers, and weakens any 
link between fiscal discipline and transfers. The overall conclusion could be that the 
formulas for determining Finance Commission require a more comprehensive reappraisal 
than has been attempted in recent years. 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
While there is no obvious fiscal disincentive effect in the Planning Commission 
approach to its transfers, neither is there a clear process of evaluating investment needs 
and priorities. A lack of coordination between the Finance and Planning Commissions, 
together with fungibility of transfers, further complicates the impact of these 
intergovernmental transfers. Table 1 reports the amount of plan transfers (grants only): 
the transfers discussed in Section 2 are in the category of ‘state plan grants’. Hence, one 
                                                 
15 Thus, both larger government deficits at the subnational level and, to some extent, increases in inter-state 
inequalities in the last decade, can be seen partly as outcomes of the functioning of India’s 
intergovernmental transfer system. 
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can see that these plan transfers are only about one-third to one-quarter of Finance 
Commission transfers in magnitude. Nevertheless, they represent an important source of 
revenue for the states. Most recently, reflecting their deteriorating fiscal positions, some 
states have been using plan transfers for meeting current salary obligations, illustrating 
the problems of the system. Of course, even if plan transfers were more effectively 
categorical, there is a significant degree of fungibility at the level of state budgets. 
While the specific purposes and matching requirements of central and centrally 
sponsored schemes make them potentially an important channel for dealing with 
spillovers, as noted, the implementation of these schemes has been problematic, with 
concerns about lack of transparency, poor selection of projects, and ineffective 
monitoring. Nevertheless, the discretionary aspect of these intergovernmental transfers 
has made them attractive to central ministries. The Planning Commission is charged with 
a role in designing and coordinating the various ministry schemes, but if one judges by 
outcomes, its effectiveness in this role is not too great. These issues are often referred to 
under the category of “expenditure quality” (e.g., World Bank, 2005), and the states’ 
fiscal stress has only exposed these long-standing problems. 
The Twelfth Finance Commission directly addresses the problem of multiple 
channels of transfer, as well as the design of the Planning Commission transfers: 
Plan grants should be given as genuine grants and states may be encouraged to 
borrow from the market directly. Such a change would require delinking of 
grants from loans in plan assistance. This would facilitate determination of 
grants according to needs and loans according to capacities. The plan size of 
each state needs to take into account the sustainable level of debt and the 
capacity to borrow from the market. A restructuring plan must include reforms 
relating to the planning process. Part of the distortion in the structure of 
expenditure derives from the distinction between plan and non-plan 
expenditures. It is inefficient to show preference for creating new assets or 
undertaking new schemes being part of the plan, while sacrificing maintenance 
of already created assets. (Finance Commission, 2004, p. 82) 
As we have noted, however, the Finance Commission does not have the power to act on 
the above recommendations. Considerable prominence in the Twelfth Finance 
Commission’s report is given to the lack of infrastructure that faces each newly 
constituted commission. This contrasts with the permanent resources available to the 
Planning Commission and the ministries. 
 
Tax Reform  
One reason that the intergovernmental transfer system comes under the strain of 
dealing with large transfers and multiple objectives is the nature of tax assignments in 
India, as outlined in Section 2. More explicitly, the states’ heavy reliance on transfers 
increases political bargaining and the softness of budget constraints, resulting in a 
possible efficiency loss (Rao and Singh, 2005, Chapter 11) and exacerbation of the states’ 
fiscal stress. A complement to reforming the intergovernmental transfer system is reform 
of tax assignments. Tax reform can also improve the efficiency of inter-state tax 
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competition, with positive implications for growth as well as the states’ long run fiscal 
situations. At the same time, it must be recognized that promoting efficiency and growth 
may require removing some of the states’ current sources of tax revenue. This is difficult 
at the best of times, and more so when the states have high fiscal deficits. Hence, a 
coordinated tax reform is required. 
Evolving a coordinated consumption-tax system remains a major challenge. Rao 
(2000) provided detailed recommendations with respect to issues such as rates, interstate 
sales taxes, and tax administration for a dual VAT coordinated between the Center and 
the states, and noted the problem created by the failure of the Constitution to explicitly 
include services within the scope of states’ sales tax authority. Rao had suggested moving 
taxation of services from the Union list, where it implicitly lay (through the Center’s 
residual powers over taxes not explicitly specified in the Constitution), to the Concurrent 
list via a constitutional amendment.  However, the central government chose instead to 
explicitly add service taxes to the Union List, via the 88th amendment to the Constitution, 
passed in January 2004, but still to be enacted. Service taxes are to be shared with the 
states, in a manner yet to be determined, and outside the common pool that is allocated by 
the Finance Commission.  It is indeed possible that the sharing of service taxes will be 
completely outside the Commission’s scope in the future, representing a reversal of 
previous measures to simplify the tax-sharing system and make it more efficient.  
On the other hand, the center has been largely successful in persuading the states 
to replace taxation of interstate sales with a destination-based VAT, and this is well on 
the way to implementation (as of March 2006). This would remove some of the internal 
barriers that have plagued the development of a true national market within India,16 and 
could also reduce tax exporting by the richer states, complementing the role of transfers 
in keeping interstate income divergence from becoming politically unacceptable. Studies 
commissioned by the Twelfth Finance Commission support the view that a properly 
designed state-level VAT would prove to be revenue augmenting over the medium to 
long term, with any transitory losses possibly compensated for by the center. The latest 
budgetary figures are consistent with this conclusion. 
Taxation of services illustrates a broader issue addressed by the Eleventh Finance 
Commission, which made a general recommendation to give the states more power to 
tax, to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance. This approach takes some pressure off the 
fiscal transfer system, allowing states that can obtain internal political support to more 
flexibly tax their own constituents for delivering benefits to them. Another possible 
example of such a tax reassignment would be to allow states to piggyback on central 
income taxes.17 With tax sharing no longer applied to specific tax “handles”, but to tax 
                                                 
16 Theories of Market Preserving Federalism (e.g., Weingast, 1993) emphasize the positive role of a 
common internal market.  In the United States, this idea was incorporated in the Interstate Commerce 
Clause. The framers of the Indian Constitution, although aware of the need to ensure a common market, 
were not averse to the idea of placing restrictions if the situation so demanded.  While they intended that 
the sales tax system in India should be destination based, the recommendations of the Taxation Enquiry 
Commission of 1953, led to the Sixth amendment adding clauses which enable the central government to 
levy taxes on inter-state transactions. State-level entry taxes are also inefficient, but once again, replacing 
them will require alternative revenue sources for the states. See Rao and Singh (2005) for further 
discussion.   
17 This change would, of course, require a constitutional amendment. 
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revenues in total, this change would give states more flexibility at the margin, where they 
properly should have it.  While states are already assigned the right to tax agricultural 
income, their use of this tax is minimal: the separation of agricultural income merely 
promotes tax evasion. Piggybacking, combined with a removal of the distinction between 
nonagricultural and agricultural income,18 would represent a change in tax assignments 
that could increase efficiency as well as reduce the states’ fiscal problems.  
 
Local Government Reform 
The states’ fiscal deterioration has taken place in a complex policy environment, 
with the creation of constitutionally recognized local governments coinciding with the 
process of national economic reform. After decades of debate, major local government 
reform began to be implemented in 1991, when two separate constitutional amendment 
bills were introduced, covering rural and urban local governments respectively.  In 1993, 
these became the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution of India. The 
amendments reduced state governments’ discretionary control over elections to rural 
local government bodies.  Direct elections to local bodies must now be held every five 
years.  Hence “voice” replaced “hierarchy” as the primary accountability mechanism 
(Hirschman, 1970; Rao and Singh, 2001). Local government reform also changed the 
nature of tax and expenditure assignments to local governments,19 and instituted a system 
of formal state-local transfers modeled on the Finance Commission component of the 
existing center-state system.  Aside from political considerations of promoting greater 
citizen involvement through decentralization, there is the potential for improving the 
quality of spending by pushing decision-making on local public goods down to the local 
level. While there are some serious issues with the new assignments, including problems 
of local capacity and efficiency of raising and spending money, we focus on the new 
transfer system and competition between state and local governments. 
  One view (e.g., World Bank, 1995) has been that formal transfers from the 
center and states to local governments could accentuate the states’ fiscal deficit problems. 
Alternatively, one can argue that a formal, rule-governed system will make existing 
problems more transparent, and therefore more easily identifiable and soluble.  In fact, 
local government finances, particularly for urban bodies, had worsened before local 
government reform, under a system of hierarchical control with supposedly strict 
monitoring by state governments.  The new State Finance Commissions (SFCs) have 
struggled to formulate the principles for sharing or assigning state taxes, tolls, and fees 
and for making grants-in-aid. There remains considerable variation in the quality of 
analysis, methodologies used, and implementation of transfers across the different states. 
Lack of political will at the state level and, perhaps most significantly, the states’ own 
fiscal problems have restricted progress in this dimension. While the current situation 
with respect to local governments seems no worse than the previous one of ad hoc and 
                                                 
18 This suggestion does not preclude provisions such as tax smoothing for farm income to mitigate the 
effects of greater risks associated with agriculture. 
19 For example, the 73rd amendment created a list of 29 different areas of rural local government functional 
responsibility, considerably broader in scope than the previous situation, though the majority of these 
remain concurrent responsibilities with the state government.   
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discretionary transfers and control of local bodies by state governments, there now seems 
to be explicit competition between state and local governments for transfers. 
After the last general election, in May 2004, the new government at the center 
proposed transferring money directly to local governments. In the past, the states received 
unconditional Finance Commission transfers earmarked for local governments, but have 
retained control of these monies. They also controlled Planning Commission and central 
ministry conditional transfers that were ostensibly targeted at district or block level rural 
government authorities. With local governments now enjoying constitutional status, the 
states are reluctant to permit new transfers direct to rural local governments, and they 
have opposed the center’s proposals, fearing that they will lead to reductions in their own 
transfer receipts. Meanwhile, the Finance Commissions have continued to make transfers 
to the states, earmarked for local bodies. The Tenth Commission allocated interim 
transfers, before the SFCs had been constituted. The Eleventh Commission had many of 
the SFC reports available, but found them inadequate as a basis for determination, and 
again made some ad hoc20 earmarked grants for local bodies, and the Twelfth 
Commission has followed this approach. Both the last two commissions have made 
copious recommendations with respect to how the states can improve local government 
functioning, including expenditure allocations, monitoring, and tax assignment. Clearly, 
similar recommendations also have value at the state level (e.g., World Bank, 2005, 
Chapters 2 and 3). Overall, local government reform adds another dimension of 
complexity – one that is often neglected – to the challenge of improving the states’ fiscal 
situation. 
 
4. Assessment and Policy Options 
Given the evolution and current complexity of India’s system of fiscal federalism, 
and the range of issues that face the states as they struggle to control their finances, it is 
useful to offer a basic analytical framework within which policy options can be 
discussed. The objectives of policy reform can be encapsulated as (1) improving 
governmental efficiency with respect to taxes and expenditures, (2) maintaining some 
degree of equity through and within the operations of the government, and (3) providing 
some sustainability and stability. Fiscal correction is properly seen as a mechanism for 
furthering these goals, rather than as an end in itself. Nevertheless, the poor fiscal 
situation of the states represents an immediate threat to all three policy objectives. 
From the perspective of the government of any single state within India’s 
democratic system, the main performance motivator is re-election, which provides 
ongoing rewards to ruling politicians. This performance incentive is attenuated when 
short-term rewards associated with rent-seeking (including interest-group lobbying as 
well as corruption) outweigh the gains from pleasing the wider electorate. Further 
complicating factors are myopic rent-seeking by the electorate which leads to populism 
(manifested in widespread subsidies), and the differing incentives of bureaucrats who 
must implement policies. For a national government, revenue is raised and spent entirely 
                                                 
20 The Commission used a formula, but this was not arrived at according to any obvious analytical 
criterion. The Twelfth Commission has followed this precedent. 
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within the jurisdiction, and performance can be judged by how efficiently these tasks are 
accomplished. For subnational governments, however, tax-sharing creates yet another 
complication. A state’s total resources depend on the decisions of the center with respect 
to revenue-raising, and potentially on the spending of the other states as well. 
The problem is referred to as a common pool problem (e.g. Purfield, 2003; 
Hausmann and Purfield, 2004). The latter paper picturesquely compares it to what 
happens when an individual goes to a restaurant in a group and orders lobster, whereas if 
he were alone, he would have ordered a cheaper item, chicken. However, this analogy 
oversimplifies, masking the problem and, therefore, the solution. In Hausmann and 
Purfield’s story, the implicit assumption is that the bill will be equally divided. Hence the 
marginal cost of an individual order of lobster is split among the entire group. Suppose 
instead that the marginal cost versus chicken of all the lobster orders is separated out and 
divided among only those who order lobster. Then the common pool problem goes away. 
The key idea is that marginal incentives must be right, so that, in the case of India’s 
states, they must bear the full marginal cost of their spending. 
With this “Marginal Principle” in mind, scattered and uneven discussions (e.g., 
Purfield, 2003) of the common pool problem, transfer dependence, soft budget 
constraints, and moral hazard can all be examined within a unified conceptual 
framework. For example, problems of soft budget constraints and moral hazard are just a 
dynamic version of the Marginal Principle, with the external source of marginal funds 
coming with a lag, through bailouts by the central government. One caveat should be 
noted: transfer dependence can still lead to income effects on states’ behavior, even when 
transfers are inframarginal. However, if one objective of transfers is to improve 
horizontal equity, these income effects may be desirable. Furthermore, they do not, by 
themselves, create an incentive for fiscal laxity. Having said this, it is possible that the 
political economy of transfer dependence may make it harder to follow the Marginal 
Principle, and this is borne in mind in the following discussion, which begins with an 
overall analysis of the causes of the current fiscal situation of the states, before turning to 
specific policy options.  
 
Explaining the Current Situation 
It must be realized that India’s intergovernmental transfer system, and its 
mechanisms for state government borrowing, were remarkably stable until the late 1980s. 
Thus, one can ask why the common pool problem or soft budget constraints did not 
manifest themselves earlier. A partial answer must lie in the changing nature of federal 
politics. As we have noted earlier, India began its independent existence with a relatively 
centralized system. Political, administrative and economic control was exercised 
effectively by the central government, in a variety of ways. Thus, for several decades, the 
shortcomings of India’s fiscal federal arrangements were masked. They did not show up 
as fiscal deficits, but instead as failures at the state government level to achieve national 
goals of providing basic education, health and nutrition, and of reducing poverty. 
Ultimately, the macroeconomic crisis of 1991, which itself was triggered by 
attempts to break out of a low growth trajectory through partial reforms, uncovered 
growing problems at the state government level. Attempts to squeeze central expenditure 
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in turn put similar squeezes on the states, through some of the intergovernmental transfer 
channels.  The states were allowed to individually pursue private investment, leading to 
some degree of tax competition that further worsened their resource position (Rao, 2003). 
Some regional parties also used their new political power in central coalition 
governments to extract additional resources from the common pool. The single worst 
factor in the worsening fiscal position of the states, however, was their mimicking at the 
state government level of the Fifth Pay Commission award for the central government. 
One can understand this as follows. Economic liberalization allowed private sector 
salaries to rise substantially, creating an envy effect for central government bureaucrats. 
Their large pay increases had a similar effect on state governments. While these 
phenomena have more to do with motivations of status and envy, economic liberalization 
was a factor. It removed some elements of an implicit social contract, without changing 
other elements of the system. Thus, institutional structures that were somewhat adequate 
in the past are no longer functional. 
This perspective on the causes of the states’ looming fiscal crisis focuses attention 
on the need for significant institutional reform with respect to the functioning of 
government and intergovernmental relations. Indeed, this also applies to the role of local 
government. While local government reform had a history and motivation far removed 
from the economic liberalization of the 1990s, the criteria for making it effective have 
much in common with changes needed at the state government level. Similarly, state-
local fiscal relations need to be developed and molded along lines following those for 
center-state fiscal institutions. However, in the following, we focus on the state 
government level, leaving it to readers to extrapolate to the local level. 
 
Reforming Institutions of Fiscal Federalism 
We have already outlined much of the case for reforming the system of transfers 
and taxes, from the perspective of improving the states’ long run fiscal situation, as well 
as the efficiency of their fiscal actions. We elaborate on some of these aspects in this 
section. One can make a case for the Finance Commission and Planning Commission 
overhauling their transfer formulae completely, to achieve greater simplicity and 
transparency with respect to meeting their objectives. Removing a significant portion of 
center-state transfers outside the political economy arena, clearly targeting them toward 
horizontal equity objectives, and doing so in a manner that does not create perverse 
incentives for recipient governments, is feasible and desirable. This approach is contrary 
to the recently popular idea of using the intergovernmental transfer system to provide 
very refined or targeted incentives to meet general fiscal balance goals, but we would 
argue that it is most appropriate for the bulk of intergovernmental transfers.21 The key 
                                                 
21 In fact, one problem with the current system is that transfers attempt to combine multiple objectives into 
overall formulae (Tables 2 and 6). Adding complex ways of rewarding fiscal discipline, as in tying some 
portion of intergovernmental transfers to state-level fiscal reforms, only compounds the problem. The 
Eleventh Finance Commission worked out such a scheme, pooling 15 per cent of revenue deficit grants and 
adding an equal amount to create a “Fiscal Reform Facility,” to be allocated among the states based on 
fulfillment of fiscal restructuring targets of tax and non-tax revenue growth, expenditures on salaries, interest 
payments and subsidies.  Problems with this scheme included the small size of the incentive fund, biases in the 
monitorable measure against smaller and poorer states, conflicts with other fiscal incentive programs, and 
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idea is that transfers should not be linked to spending plans or projected resource gaps. 
This is the only way to respect the Marginal Principle described at the beginning of this 
section. 
To meet horizontal equity objectives, it would be preferable to establish 
exogenous levels of per capita spending for the states, determine their fiscal capacity, and 
make transfers based on the difference. Thus the formula would be based on normative 
levels of government spending, rather than an arbitrary weighting scheme. M. Govinda 
Rao has been a strong advocate of this approach, including in his role as economic 
advisor to the Ninth Finance Commission, but subsequent Commissions, despite 
broadening their scope in other ways, have not tackled the task of rethinking the transfer 
system. Once minimum levels of spending (predicated on the states’ norms of fiscal 
effort) are met through these equalizing transfers, the remaining amount of transfers can 
be determined by pure tax-sharing considerations, based on the states’ income shares. 
Grants based on marginal needs, and any form of categorical grants (which are subject to 
fungibility anyway) would be done away with in the above restructuring. 
With respect to the Planning Commission, there is also a case for overhaul. 
Planning Commission grants are meant to be for developmental purposes, which might 
be interpreted as capital spending, although investments in human capital are typically 
counted as current spending according to budgeting conventions. One can make a case 
for the Planning Commission restricting itself to certain types of categorical grants, and 
making allocations based on transparent normative criteria, paralleling those proposed for 
the Finance Commission. The states could be left to choose projects within broad 
categories. Loan components could be done away with, as recommended by the Twelfth 
Finance Commission. The Planning Commission could also play a stronger role in 
designing and coordinating individual ministry schemes, which have otherwise 
proliferated into a chaotic jumble. The Finance Minister, in the 2005 budget, noted the 
need for better monitoring of the outcomes of all these transfer schemes, but it is unclear 
what progress has been made. The outcome of these reforms would at least be less time 
wasted on center-state bargaining, less uncertainty, and greater transparency. 
Several issues remain to be addressed. The first is political feasibility and 
desirability. Here, India’s polity has shown itself capable of absorbing considerable 
change, provided that the losers can be compensated adequately. In the case of the 
previous change in the tax-sharing system, implemented after the Tenth Finance 
Commission’s recommendation, and in the innovations in VAT and services taxation, the 
political actors have worked out the requisite compensation principles, or are cognizant 
of the need to do so. Second, growing regional inequality might threaten political 
stability. The evidence from several studies suggests growing inequality among the 
Indian states in the past three decades, with the rate increasing in the 1990s.22  
Differences in infrastructure and institutions that seem to explain interstate differences 
have been persistent, and intergovernmental transfers have not made a substantial 
difference. Reforms in the transfer system would not solve problems of increasing inter-
state inequalities, since the variation in SDP per capita is far greater than the level of per 
                                                                                                                                                 
opportunities for moving deficits off budget to manipulate the program outcomes.  The Twelfth Finance 
Commission rejected this approach, but retained fiscal discipline weights for tax devolution (Table 6). 
22 See Rao and Singh (2005) for a summary of these studies. 
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capita transfers, but would make horizontal equity in public services more transparently 
achievable. The center must recognize the special problems of poorer states in achieving 
fiscal adjustment, and the transfer system is where this recognition can be implemented. 
A third issue is that of the effectiveness and efficiency of state governments. The 
dominant policy instinct is to try to control the state governments through incentive 
mechanisms administered by the central government. The perspective offered in this 
paper is that the center should focus on avoiding disincentives, and make it as easy as 
possible for electorates to assess the performance of the state government. Thus, rather 
than rely on categorical grants so heavily, as the Twelfth Finance Commission has done, 
non-categorical grants, supplemented by league tables of spending on key sectors such as 
health and education might be preferable. Ultimately, of course, even spending figures 
can be meaningless, as illustrated by the problem of absentee rural schoolteachers, who 
draw salaries but do not teach. However, monitoring by citizens and their agents (NGOs, 
the media), and better electoral accountability are more likely to succeed than central 
government controls. 
Changes in tax assignments are an important complement to reform of the 
intergovernmental transfer system.  In the discussion of the Marginal Principle, we noted 
that the key idea is that marginal funds for expenditure by the recipient of transfers 
should come from its own resources. However, we also noted that large transfers may 
make it politically more difficult to maintain the Marginal Principle. This is because the 
overall link between own taxes and spending, as perceived by constituents and 
politicians, is weakened. Thus, transfer dependence, even if it does not directly violate 
the Marginal Principle, may still be a source of problems.23 This logic suggests that the 
states’ ability to raise their own revenues should be strengthened. This, in turn, can be 
done by strengthening tax assignment to the states. Section 3 has discussed several 
possibilities for achieving this goal. 
 
Deficits and Debt 
The severe deterioration in state finances (Table 4) has taken place despite 
ostensible controls on state government borrowing. Technically, the states cannot keep 
borrowing to finance deficits without the acquiescence of the central government, but the 
latter has been unable to enforce hard budget constraints on the states. We have indicated 
that this is at least partly related to the increased power of regional parties in national 
coalition governments. In initial attempts to impose conditions on state borrowing that 
would encourage fiscal reforms, the center was not able to harden budget constraints. For 
example, in 1999-2000, eleven states signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with 
the center, promising fiscal reforms in exchange for ways and means advances 
(essentially, overdrafts) on tax devolution and grants due to them. In some cases, 
however, the center had to convert these advances into three-year loans. The Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) reported stopping payments to three states (Reserve Bank of India, 
                                                 
23 Hausmann and Purfield (2004) discuss the possibility that noncooperative sub-national behavior is more 
likely in federal systems with large vertical imbalances, which encourage political bargaining. One can 
frame this as an indirect violation of the Marginal Principle, since lobbying behavior affects marginal 
transfers. 
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2001), but the political difficulty of not bailing out states that are both poor and populous 
is obvious.24  
A more recent development was the enactment of the central FRBM Act in 2003. 
The law was initially recommended by the Eleventh Finance Commission, and required 
considerable political bargaining before it was passed. A detailed roadmap for achieving 
deficit reduction targets mandated by the act was prepared the following year (Ministry 
of Finance, 2004).25 Initially, five states (Karnataka, Kerala, Punjab, Tamil Nadu and 
Uttar Pradesh) followed the center and passed their own FRBM laws. More recently, six 
other states have followed.26 Coordinated and uniform implementation of the state laws 
(Kopits, 2001) would help control externalities or free-riding behavior, given that 
enforcement provisions are weak in the Indian case (Hausmann and Purfield, 2004; 
Howes, 2005), but the approach of individual states choosing their own provisions may 
be the most practicable. The Twelfth Finance Commission does provide some 
coordination by recommending minimum provisions for state level FRBM laws.27 
In addition to reforms in tax and transfer systems as ways of reducing subnational 
fiscal deficits, an important area of reform relates to the process of borrowing by the 
states, which has hitherto been ad hoc and opaque. Improvements in financial 
information, budgeting and accounting practices, regulatory norms and monitoring are all 
required here, as well as changes in the institutional rules (IMF, 2003; Hausmann and 
Purfield, 2004). These reforms parallel many of those required for India’s financial sector 
as a whole: state governments just happen to be among the most powerful of those 
entities taking advantage of poorly functioning credit markets to run up unpaid debts. 
Some reform is already taking place, including statutory or administrative borrowing 
ceilings, guarantee redemption funds, explicit restructuring and write-offs,28 and market-
based borrowing mechanisms such as auctions conducted by the RBI.  
Given the high stock of debt of the states (Table 4, last column), some 
restructuring is also important. In 2002-03, the central government introduced a debt-
swap scheme to enable state governments to swap their high cost debt, owed to the 
center, for additional market borrowings and a part of current small saving transfers. The 
Twelfth Finance Commission report provides further recommendations along these lines. 
Following its terms of reference and the precedent of previous commissions, the latest 
                                                 
24 Political considerations also constrain the center to make plan loans at the same interest rate to all states, 
removing even that device for providing appropriate marginal incentives.  
25 This report placed a heavy emphasis on tax reform to increase government revenues as a way of 
reducing deficits. We have discussed tax reform more broadly, from an efficiency as well as a deficit 
reduction perspective, earlier in this section, and in Section 3. 
26 These states, which have acted after the Twelfth Finance Commission’s report, are Maharashtra, Orissa, 
Rajasthan, Assam, Haryana and Andhra Pradesh. It is too soon to judge the nature of implementation of 
their acts. The Twelfth Finance Commission recommended tying debt relief to passing FRBM laws. 
27 William McCarten (personal communication) notes that the Maharashtra FR law calls for an 
independent review panel to provide fiscal monitoring and fiscal rule infraction identification, and suggests 
that the states could coordinate to support a single body, independent of the Center, as a way of achieving 
more effective benchmarking of fiscal performance. Hausmann and Purfield (2004) also suggest an 
independent scorekeeper. Rather than a new agency, Finance Commissions could play this role, as the 
Twelfth Finance Commission has already done to some extent. 
28 Many of these reforms are discussed in detail in the Twelfth Finance Commission Report. 
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report also provides for some debt relief, but rightly shies away from linking it to 
measures of performance such as the human development index or investment climate. In 
doing so, the Twelfth Commission has avoided an approach which had been pushed by 
its predecessor. Instead, the latest report ties debt relief to states’ explicitly setting fiscal 
responsibility goals, and meeting deficit reduction targets. The Commission’s specific 
recommendations are complex, and potentially inconsistent in places (Rajaraman, 2005). 
There are also related questions about enforceability. In particular, the poorest highly 
indebted states may face deficit and debt situations that can only be realistically dealt 
with by specifically targeted debt relief, beyond what is currently recommended. 
Nevertheless, the latest plan has the virtue of giving the majority of states a way to climb 
out of their current fiscal holes in the medium term, thereby isolating those states that 
may require long term special assistance.29 
The latest Finance Commission report also details an approach to reducing the 
central government’s role as a lender to the states, replacing it with market borrowing. 
This would apply to several channels of central loans, including those through the 
Planning Commission and central ministries. The RBI is exploring the development of 
institutions to support this shift to market borrowing, including offering mechanisms, 
secondary markets for government debt, credit ratings, and methods of regulation and 
monitoring. Ultimately, as we have argued, this is the only way to at least partially 
respect the Marginal Principle, since borrowing from the central government is subject to 
a dynamic common pool problem. It is still possible that state governments will require 
bailouts in extraordinary circumstances, but a priori market discipline can restrict the 
frequency of such occurrences.30 The political economy of such bailouts is also made 
more transparent, as compared to the current system of regular debt rescheduling, write-
offs and implicit subsidies. The Twelfth Finance Commission Report also proposes 
annual ceilings on state borrowing, which would further harden budget constraints. 
Again, some of the poorest states may require special treatment in terms of central loans, 
since they may not be able to utilize market borrowing, but they can be identified ex post 
for this treatment, rather than the presumption being that all states need to rely on the 
center for capital funds.  
 
Governance 
Several aspects of reform in governance deserve consideration in order to support 
improvements in state finances. Possible reforms include internal state government 
restructuring as well as strengthening institutions for intergovernmental relations. Perhaps 
                                                 
29 An anonymous referee has noted that the debt relief plan does not take account of the additional fiscal 
pressures placed by trade liberalization and enhanced global competition. While it is true that both these 
factors add to the states’ fiscal challenges, it is arguable whether their impacts are definite enough to 
quantify appropriate relief measures. In fact, invoking such factors can become yet another avenue for 
softening states’ budget constraints, 
30 Note that true market discipline will require other sources of borrowing and central government 
guarantees to be limited, and lenders to also face the test of the market. In particular, the states must not 
have easy access to captive sources of finance, including nationalized financial institutions. In other words, 
fiscal reform is ultimately closely tied to, and dependent on, financial sector reform (Singh and Srinivasan, 
2005a, 2005b). 
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the major question that must be addressed is how to manage fiscal adjustment in a 
manner that minimizes the pain for poorer citizens. The states, as noted in Section 2, have 
primary expenditure responsibilities in areas pertaining to basic health and education.  
In fact, fiscal adjustment may provide the impetus for tackling long-standing 
problems of inefficiency in expenditures. Improvements in efficiency can allow fewer 
rupees to achieve the same or even greater benefits than is currently the case. Examples 
of existing “X-inefficiency” include the functioning of core administrations, many plan 
and ministry projects, and PSEs such as the SEBs. The evidence indicates that for many 
of the states, subsidies and salaries are taking a larger and larger share of expenditure, 
though the states’ performance in this respect is not uniform (e.g., Howes and Murgai, 
2005).31 In many of these cases, expenditure reform will result in losers, since public 
sector employees currently enjoy monetary rents or leisure that will be lost. However, at 
least some of the leisure in inefficient organizations is involuntary, and results in 
frustration rather than any utility gain. As for the impacts on the poor, the World Bank 
(2003) is quite clear in its conclusions: “The burden of weak administration falls 
particularly on the poor, who suffer from skewed government spending, limited access to 
services, and employee indifference.” Thus, it seems that there is room for fiscal 
adjustment that benefits rather than hurts the poor.32 The areas for improved 
administration include budgeting procedures, accounting and auditing methods, personnel 
policies and tax collection, among others (Finance Commission, 2004; World Bank, 
2005). One cannot overemphasize the importance of these basic improvements in 
government financial management and functioning.33  
The efficiency of delivery of health and education in rural areas can also be 
improved substantially, either through restructuring government efforts, or bringing in 
private participants such as nongovernmental organizations or community groups. There 
is substantial evidence that institutional innovations can improve efficiency (e.g., Drèze 
and Gazdar, 1996; PROBE, 1999; World Bank, 2003, Chapter 3; Howes and Murgai, 
2005). In either case, the gains come from improved incentives and reduced transaction 
costs. In addition to reforming at the state level itself, if local government reform is 
carried out in a manner that enhances transparency and accountability, both these 
channels of improvement can be realized.34   
In addition to internal restructuring of government, the nature of 
intergovernmental institutions also matters for state finances. The previous paternalistic 
                                                 
31 An in-depth analysis of the social rationale for subsidies, and their cost effectiveness in fulfilling that 
rationale is overdue.  See Mundle and Rao (1991) and Rao and Mundle (1992) for a classic analysis. 
32 In this context, it has also been noted that a system of explicit user charges often allows for more 
efficient as well as more equitable delivery of services (e.g., drinking water, health and education: see 
World Bank, 2003, Chapter 3, as well as World Bank, 2005). This would clearly be part of a necessary 
program of reducing inefficient and poorly targeted subsidies. 
33 It is noteworthy that the quality of government institutions in India lags so far behind best practice, even 
after a decade and a half of reform. 
34 See Rao and Singh (2005), Chapter 13 for further details. Of course there are many areas where the state 
governments must continue to play a dominant role, and where more cannot be squeezed out of the existing 
expenditures by improving incentives for those responsible for the service delivery. In such cases, shifts in 
expenditure and/or new resources for increased expenditure are required, but the latter option should be a 
last resort, given the states’ fiscal situation. 
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model of central control has been changed by economic reform and by political 
fragmentation at the center. Since issues of tax and expenditure reform and controlling 
fiscal deficits require some coordination between the center and the states, institutions 
such as the ISC may actually have a greater role to play than in the past. While states that 
are pivotal, and hence politically powerful in a coalition government at the center may be 
able to directly extract concessions from the central government (as Andhra Pradesh35 
appears to have done in some cases in the previous national government), this does not 
make the ISC redundant. The potential role of the ISC is precisely to provide an 
alternative to such ad hoc bargaining. Bargaining over durable changes in rules 
governing the federation is also quite different from bargaining over specific instances. 
For example, the ISC was an important forum for gaining acceptance of the change in tax 
sharing recommended by the Tenth Finance Commission.36 Tax reform, changes in the 
way that states borrow, and regulation of sectors such as power are all areas where the 
ISC can provide a less public, more focused forum for bargaining over such issues than is 
possible in Parliament. The role of the ISC may also be expanded if the current process of 
planning is reformed. The NDC now serves as the bargaining forum for plan transfers 
and loans: if these were replaced by a dual system of block grants and market-based 
loans, it would make the NDC redundant. Instead, the ISC may be the place for evolving 
a new institutional framework; bargaining over general rules, not specific instances.37  
 
5. Conclusions 
Clearly, state finances in India have deteriorated substantially in the past decade, 
and require urgent attention. In some respects, the problem is worse than that indicated by 
budget deficits, since the states also have large off-budget liabilities. We have suggested 
in this paper that the source of the problem lies partially, or even substantially, in 
governmental institutions that have not kept pace with changes in the functioning of 
India’s market economy. Thus, tackling the problems of state finances requires broad 
systemic reforms. For example, we have identified a simple principle for redesigning 
India’s system of intergovernmental transfers, including implicit transfers made through 
debt relief and restructuring. This principle emphasizes the importance of state 
governments bearing the costs of their expenditures at the margin.  
Recent attention has focused on creating institutions for market borrowing by the 
states, and tax reform to improve the efficiency of taxes assigned to the states. The 
former change, in particular, is in the spirit of the Marginal Principle, applied in a 
dynamic context. In this paper, we have also emphasized changes in tax assignments and 
                                                 
35 The Telegu Desam Party of Andhra Pradesh also controlled the state government at that time. In other 
cases the regional party in the ruling central coalition may not have been in a position to represent its state’s 
interests as forcefully. 
36 More recently, it has also been a place where an important change in the rules governing inter-state water 
disputes has been approved by the states (Richards and Singh, 2002). See also Kapur (2001) for additional 
examples. 
37 This is an extension of Riker’s instrumentalist view of federalism (Riker, 1975, pp. 113-114), to include 
bargaining not just in constitution making, but also in evolution of subsequent governance, and not just for 
territorial protection or gain, but also over splitting the economic pie. 
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in the intergovernmental transfer system that would support the Marginal Principle. 
Analyses by recent Finance Commissions have argued along similar lines with respect to 
tax assignments, and indicated the general principles that might govern center-state 
transfers, but have either shied away from specific changes, or not been able to affect 
practical policy. 
The broad approach adopted in this paper is not inconsistent with the recent 
comprehensive survey of state fiscal reforms undertaken by the World Bank (World 
Bank, 2005). The differences in what is presented here are mostly ones of degree of 
emphasis, although we have attempted a more coherent theoretical treatment. The World 
Bank report offers reform scenarios that, in terms of quantitative impact, emphasize 
increasing revenue-GSDP ratios, controlling wage bills and increasing capital spending 
while maintaining overall expenditure-GSDP ratios, and increasing central transfers, 
mostly for the poorer states (World Bank, 2005, Tables 5.3 and 5.4). As is typically the 
case with these scenarios, they are based on educated guesses of impacts, rather than 
behavioral modeling.38 Hence, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide alternative 
quantitative projections of how state finances might evolve under different scenarios, 
though revenue augmentation, expenditure control, and improving expenditure quality 
are all obvious and significant components of desirable reform. Underpinning all possible 
reforms, however, must be a clearer recognition of the Marginal Principle and its 
incentive consequences. 
Can reforms be achieved in practice? India’s political system is “leaving money 
on the table.” It is therefore up to India’s state governments, in cooperation with the 
central government (which now more clearly incorporates and reflects regional and 
subnational interests) to recognize this, and to devise politically feasible reforms that will 
allow potential gains to be realized and to be shared in a mutually acceptable manner. At 
a conference at Cornell University three years, ago, one of India’s foremost fiscal experts, 
M. Govinda Rao, offered a cautionary conclusion to his own detailed, quantitative survey 
of state finances in India: 
Thus, the States have to traverse far in restructuring their finances. These require 
a series of reform measures on the expenditure and tax systems, power sector 
reform and restructuring state enterprises, administrative reengineering, building 
up a proper information system and computerization of tax administration.  
What has been achieved so far has been negligible.  The fiscal reform journey 
towards achieving fiscal balance and consolidation and generation of quality 
infrastructure and a competitive environment will be long and arduous and 
opposition to reforms from vested interests will be strong.  Political will and 
administrative competence, creating an awareness for the need for reform in the 
general public are the most important ingredients that will be needed in 
abundance to achieve the desired goals. (Rao, 2003) 
This perspective is still valid. Though many small steps have been taken in the past three 
years, much still remains to be one. For example, the critical issue of power sector reform 
has barely been tackled, and this has held back the whole economy, as well as 
compounding the states’ fiscal problems. On a more optimistic note, the explicit 
                                                 
38 See Singh and Srinivasan (2005b) for more on this issue. 
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incorporation of fiscal responsibility goals into state-level legislation represents a 
significant step forward in defining a concrete agenda for fiscal reform. Tax reform, too, 
has moved forward in the last year. 
We end with one final point on the role of policymakers and policy advisors. It is 
clear that all the states have been subject to common economic and political forces, 
which have led to deterioration in their finances. Nevertheless, there has been substantial 
variation in the performance of different states, not just fiscally, but also in growth and in 
broader measures of human development. Thus, the quality of leadership and 
policymaking matters. To expand on Rao’s conclusion, in addition to the raising public 
awareness of the need for reform, making the link between policy and outcomes more 
transparent at the state level is needed in order to ensure that state government 
policymaking moves in the right direction. 
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Table 1:   Composition of Central Transfers to States (Rs.  Billion, Percentages) 
 
 
Finance Commission 
Transfers 
Plan Grants Plan Periods 
/ Years 
Tax  
Devolution 
Grants Total 
  
State Plan 
Schemes 
Central 
Schemes
Total 
  
Other 
Grants 
Total 
Fourth Plan 45.60 8.60 54.20 10.80 9.70 20.50 9.30 83.90 
(1969-74) (54.35) (10.25) (64.60) (12.87) (11.56) (24.43) (11.08) (100.00) 
Fifth Plan 82.70 28.20 110.90 29.10 19.30 48.40 5.40 164.70 
(1974-79) (50.21) (17.12) (67.33) (17.67) (11.72) (29.39) (3.28) (100.00) 
Sixth Plan 237.30 21.40 258.70 73.80 69.00 142.80 15.10 416.50 
(1980-85) (56.97) (5.14) (62.11) (17.72) (16.57) (34.29) (3.63) (100.00) 
Seventh Plan 494.60 62.70 557.40 155.20 165.10 320.30 35.20 913.10 
(1985-90) (54.17) (6.87) (61.04) (17.00) (18.08) (35.08) (3.85) (100.00) 
Annual Plan  172.00 34.50 206.40 57.20 55.40 112.50 10.20 329.40 
1991-92 (52.22) (10.47) (62.66) (17.36) (16.82) (34.15) (3.10) (100.00) 
Eighth Plan 1318.50 147.20 1465.70 483.40 364.70 848.40 58.40 2373.10 
(1992-97) (55.56) (6.20) (61.76) (20.37) (15.37) (35.75) (2.46) (100.00) 
1997-98 404.11 16.80 420.91 120.08 67.56 187.64 37.80 646.35 
  (62.52) (2.60) (65.12) (18.58) (10.45) (29.03) (5.85) (100.00) 
1998-99 394.20 14.20 408.40 132.70 71.10 203.80 20.60 632.80 
  (62.29) (2.24) (64.54) (20.97) (11.24) (32.21) (3.26) (100.00) 
1999-00 441.21 19.88 461.09 163.16 82.03 245.19 41.14 747.42 
  (59.03) (2.66) (61.69) (21.83) (10.98) (32.80) (5.50) (100.00) 
2000-01 RE 518.27 121.69 639.96 157.59 136.76 294.35 56.99 991.30 
 (52.28) (12.28) (64.56) (15.90) (13.80) (29.69) (5.75) (100.00) 
2001-02 BE 603.5 95.34 698.84 190.67 152.52 343.19 47.04 1089.07 
 (55.41) (8.75) (64.17) (17.51) (14.00) (31.51) (4.32) (100.00) 
 
 
Notes: RE: Revised Estimates, BE: Budget Estimates 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005) 
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Table 2: Formula for Distributing State Plan Assistance 
 
 
Criteria 
 
Share in 
central plan 
assistance   
(per cent) 
 
Share of 
grants and 
loans 
 
Distribution 
criteria 
non-special 
category 
states 
 
A.   Special category States  
 
30 
 
90:10 
 
 
 
B.   Non-special category States  
 
     (i)   Population (1971) 
     (ii)  Per capita income, of which 
           (a)  According to the ‘deviation’ 
                method covering only the 
                States with per capita 
                income below the national  
                average 
 
           (b)  According to the `distance' 
                method covering all the  
                non-special category states 
                 
     (iii) Fiscal performance, 
           of which 
           (a)  Tax effort  
           (b)  Fiscal management 
           (c)  National objectives 
 
      (iv) Special problems 
 
Total             
 
70 
 
30:70 
 
 
 
 
60.0 
25.0 
 
20.0 
 
 
 
 
 
5.0 
 
 
7.5 
 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
 
7.5 
 
100.0 
 
Notes: 1. The formula is as revised in December, 1991; 2. Fiscal management is assessed as the 
difference between States' own total plan resources estimated at the time of finalizing annual plan and their 
actual performance, considering latest five years; 3. Under the criterion of the performance in respect of 
certain programs of national priorities the approved formula covers four objectives, viz.  (i) population 
control, (ii) elimination of illiteracy, (iii) on-time completion of externally aided projects, and (iv) success 
in land reforms. 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005) 
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Table 3: Trends in Revenue and Expenditure Components, All States (% of GDP) 
 
Period Own Tax 
Revenues 
Own 
Non-Tax 
Revenues 
Finance 
Commission 
Transfers 
Non-Finance 
Commission 
Transfers 
Revenue 
Expenditures 
Interest 
Payments 
Pensions 
1993-96 5.27  1.55  2.94 1.62 12.00  1.86 0.63 
2000-03 5.44 1.26 2.88 1.23 13.34  2.65 1.25 
Change 0.17  -0.29 -0.05 -0.39 1.34  0.79  0.62 
 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) 
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Table 4: Comparative Fiscal Performance, Major States (% of GSDP) 
 
 Revenue Deficit, 
2000-03 (Rank) 
Change in 
Revenue Deficit, 
1993-96 to  
2000-03 (Rank) 
Fiscal Deficit, 
2000-03 (Rank) 
Change in 
Fiscal Deficit, 
1993-96 to 
2000-03 (Rank) 
Debt, 2000-03 
Andhra Pradesh  -2.03 (13) -1.51 (11) -4.57 (9) -1.41 (13) 29.93 (11) 
Bihar  -1.87 (14) -0.04 (15) -4.52 (10) -1.67 (10) 44.35 (5) 
Goa  -2.44 (10) -3.89 (3) -4.68 (6) -2.38 (4) 33.54 (9) 
Gujarat  -4.66 (3) -4.75 (1) -5.74 (5) -3.93 (2) 37.92 (7) 
Haryana  -1.32 (15) -0.56 (14) -3.69 (15) -1.19 (14) 28.02 (12) 
Karnataka  -2.21 (11) -2.15 (9) -4.37 (11) -1.65 (11) 27.27 (13) 
Kerala  -4.17 (5) -2.99 (5) -5.13 (6) -1.81 (6) 37.58 (8) 
Madhya Pradesh  -2.05 (12) -1.44 (12) -3.94 (13) -1.78 (7) 30.42 (10) 
Maharashtra  -3.09 (7) -3.00 (4) -4.12 (12) -1.96 (5) 27.11 (14) 
Orissa  -4.91 (2) -2.91 (6) -7.84 (1) -3.21 (3) 63.68 (1) 
Punjab  -4.53 (4) -2.66 (8) -6.14 (3) -1.77 (8) 46.66 (3) 
Rajasthan  -3.87 (6) -2.78 (7) -6.05 (4) -1.54 (12) 44.88 (4) 
Tamil Nadu  -2.50 (9) -1.78 (10) -3.75 (14) -1.77 (8) 26.16 (15) 
Uttar Pradesh  -2.98 (8) -1.21 (13) -5.07 (7) -1.03 (15) 46.94 (2) 
West Bengal  -5.47 (1) -3.95 (2) -7.31 (2) -4.13 (1) 42.73 (6) 
 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) 
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Table 5: Comparative Revenues and Expenditures, Major States (% of GSDP) 
 
 Own Tax 
Revenue,  
2000-03 (Rank) 
Change in Own 
Tax Revenue, 
1993-96 to 2000-
03 (Rank) 
Revenue 
Expenditure, 
2000-03 (Rank) 
Change in 
Revenue 
Expenditure, 
1993-96 to 
2000-03 (Rank) 
Andhra Pradesh  7.30 (9) 1.40 (12) 15.56 (10) 2.08 (9) 
Bihar  4.46 (2) 0.75 (7) 18.11 (3) 1.60 (11) 
Goa  6.46 (6) -1.45 (1) 17.25 (5) 0.13 (15) 
Gujarat  7.71 (10) 0.20 (5) 18.37 (2) 5.85 (1) 
Haryana  8.30 (13) 1.09 (9) 13.45 (15) 0.39 (14) 
Karnataka  8.33 (14) -0.19 (4) 15.33 (11) 1.36 (12) 
Kerala  8.11 (12) -0.34 (3) 16.11 (8) 1.18 (13) 
Madhya Pradesh  6.45 (5) 1.53 (13) 16.74 (7) 3.45 (3) 
Maharashtra  7.76 (11) 1.12 (10) 14.10 (14) 3.42 (4) 
Orissa  5.81 (3) 1.87 (14) 22.22 (1) 5.74 (2) 
Punjab  7.13 (8) 1.87 (14) 15.33 (11) 2.59 (7) 
Rajasthan  6.48 (7) 0.25 (6) 18.06 (4) 2.63 (6) 
Tamil Nadu  9.00 (15) 0.98 (8) 15.60 (9) 1.66 (10) 
Uttar Pradesh  5.88 (4) 1.12 (10) 16.78 (6) 2.50 (8) 
West Bengal  4.26 (1) -1.20 (2) 15.02 (13) 3.23 (5) 
 
Source: Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) 
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Table 6: Criteria and Relative Weights for Tax Devolution 
 
Criterion 
Weight (%) 
11th FC 
Weight (%) 
12th FC 
1.  Population (1971 Census) 10 25 
2.  Income (Distance Method)* 62.5 50 
3.  Area 7.5 10 
4.  Index of Infrastructure 7.5 0 
5.  Tax Effort** 5.0 7.5 
6.  Fiscal Discipline*** 7.5 7.5 
 
Notes: *The distance method is given by:  (Yh-Yi)Pi/Σ(Yh-Yi)Pi   where, where Yi and Yh represent per 
capita SDP of the ith and the highest income State respectively and Pi is the population of the ith State . 
** Tax Effort (η) is estimated as (η) = (Ti / Yi) / (0.5 1/Yi) where, Ti is the per capita tax revenue collected 
by the ith State and Yi is the per capita State domestic product of the ith State. 
*** Estimated as the improvement in the ratio of own revenue of a state to its revenue expenditures divided 
by a similar ratio for all States averaged for the period 1966-99 over 1991-1993. 
 
Source: Rao and Singh (2005), Twelfth Finance Commission Report (Finance Commission, 2004) 
 
 
